About Going Big
As the 2022 midterm election season approaches, Republicans, increasingly the national minority, are trying to break our democracy in order to cling to power. As Robert Kuttner writes in GOING BIG: FDR’s Legacy, Biden’s New Deal, and the Struggle to Save Democracy, “Joe Biden’s presidency will be either a historic pivot back to New Deal economics and forward to energized democracy, or a heartbreaking interregnum between two bouts of deepening American fascism. We are facing the most momentous threat to the American republic since the Civil War.”
Speaking
Bob is available to speak on the following topics:
- How Democrats Can Avoid the 2022 Midterm Wipeout?
- The China Challenge and the Next Global System
- How to Damp Down Inflation Without Strangling the Economy
- How Extreme Globalization Destroys Democracy
- Fixing the Supply Chain Mess
- The Case for a Positive Economic Nationalism
Articles
AMERICAN PROSPECT
Summers Watch
FEATURES IN OTHER MAGAZINES
Warren vs. Sanders (Salon)
GREATEST HITS
The Emblem of This Era
COLUMNS
We Are Still A Sitting Duck For Russian Hacking, HuffPost
Radio & TV Appearances
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Bob Kuttner on PBS on Bannon
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Bob Kuttner and Sean Hannity
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Let’s Make Banking Boring Again
Why Economic Growth Has Not Produced Greater Equality in American Society
The United States is wealthier than it was a generation ago. Its economy produces more goods and services, technology has transformed entire industries, and household incomes have risen over long periods. Yet the rewards of that expansion remain distributed unevenly. Economic growth has increased the resources available to American society without guaranteeing that those resources translate into comparable gains in wages, assets, or opportunities for everyone.
The distinction matters for economic policy and democratic life. A country can record impressive growth while many households struggle to afford housing, build savings, or give their children a better start. Understanding that tension requires looking beyond gross domestic product to the institutions that shape how prosperity is shared.
A growing economy is not necessarily a more equal one
Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the value of economic output. It does not tell us how that output is divided among workers, business owners, investors, and households at different points in the income distribution. Nor does it reveal whether rising incomes are keeping pace with essential costs or whether families are accumulating lasting wealth.
There has been genuine progress. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2025 income findings, real median household income reached $87,460 in 2025, a record in its historical series. The same report found no statistically significant change in its measure of income inequality from 2024 to 2025. A record median income and persistent inequality can coexist: one describes the typical household's income level, while the other describes the distance between households across the distribution.
The longer view reveals a deeper divergence. The Congressional Budget Office's analysis of income distribution through 2023 finds that the top 1 percent of households received 13 percent of income after federal taxes and means-tested transfers in 2023, up from 7 percent in 1979. Tax and transfer policies reduce inequality relative to market incomes, but they have not erased the long-run concentration of gains at the top.
Why averages can mislead
An increase in average income can be driven by exceptionally large gains among high earners. Median income, which identifies the midpoint of the distribution, answers a different question. Neither measure alone captures wealth, the security of employment, geographic differences, or the prospects of children born into families with few assets.
To assess the consequences of growth, policymakers need to ask three separate questions: How much additional income is being generated? Who receives it? And does that income improve the capacity of households to build economic security over time?
Productivity rose, but bargaining power did not keep pace
For much of the postwar era, economic growth was broadly associated with rising pay, expanding union coverage, and the development of a substantial middle class. That settlement was never equally accessible to everyone, but labor institutions and public policy helped connect national prosperity to the living standards of ordinary workers.
Since the late 1970s, that connection has weakened. The Economic Policy Institute's productivity–pay tracker documents a widening gap between growth in economy-wide net productivity and the hourly compensation of typical production and nonsupervisory workers. The precise size of the gap depends on how productivity, compensation, and prices are measured, but the broader problem remains: greater output per hour does not automatically ensure proportionate gains for the typical worker.
The distribution of bargaining power helps explain why. Employers, workers, shareholders, and executives do not enter the economy with identical leverage. Where unions are weak, labor markets are concentrated, or jobs are easy to outsource, employees may have less ability to claim a share of productivity gains. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 10.0 percent of wage and salary workers belonged to unions in 2025, compared with 20.1 percent in 1983, the first year with comparable data.
Technology and global competition are also part of the story. Automation can displace some tasks while increasing demand and pay for others; international trade can lower consumer prices while exposing particular industries and communities to job losses. Those pressures are real, but their effects are mediated by labor standards, competition policy, public investment, and workers' capacity to negotiate. Economic change is not independent of political choices.
Wealth turns unequal rewards into unequal starting points
Income is what a household receives over time. Wealth is the value of what it owns, less what it owes. That distinction is fundamental because wealth provides resilience and opportunity in ways that a paycheck alone cannot. A household with investments or home equity can absorb an emergency, finance a move, or help a child with education or a down payment. A household living paycheck to paycheck faces greater risks even when its income is rising.
The Federal Reserve's 2025 Survey of Consumer Finances illustrates the imbalance between a typical family's balance sheet and the broader accumulation of assets. In 2025, median family net worth was $215,900, while mean family net worth was approximately $1.24 million. The much higher mean reflects the influence of families holding very large amounts of wealth; it should not be mistaken for what a typical family possesses.
Asset ownership also determines who benefits most when financial markets and property values rise. Owners of equities, businesses, and homes can see their net worth increase without an equivalent rise in wages. Those without significant assets may experience rising rents or higher barriers to buying a home instead. Over time, differences in accumulated wealth can compound through investment returns and inheritance.
These patterns have a historical dimension. Discriminatory access to credit, housing, and employment limited wealth accumulation for generations of Black Americans and other excluded groups. Although individual outcomes vary widely, historical restrictions and contemporary differences in assets remain relevant to understanding racial wealth gaps. They cannot be explained adequately by current earnings alone.
The American Dream depends on mobility, not just output
Economic growth is often defended by the promise that each generation will live better than the one before it. Whether that promise is being kept is an empirical question, not a conclusion that follows from GDP growth.
Research by Raj Chetty and colleagues on absolute income mobility estimated that about 90 percent of Americans born in 1940 earned more than their parents at a comparable age, after adjusting for inflation. For children born in the 1980s, the share was approximately 50 percent. Their analysis found that a more unequal distribution of growth played a larger role in the decline than slower overall growth alone.
That result does not mean every community or generation has followed the same trajectory. Mobility varies by place, family circumstances, race, access to education, and local labor-market conditions. The broad lesson is that growth can enlarge the economic pie while leaving the chances of moving up increasingly dependent on where a person begins.
Housing illustrates the mechanism. Areas with strong job markets may also have high rents and home prices, making it difficult for lower-income families to move to opportunity. Schools, transportation, access to affordable health care, and neighborhood conditions shape what people can do with their earnings. When the costs of participating in a growing economy rise faster than household security, national prosperity may not feel like progress.
Reading the evidence: income, wealth, and mobility measure different things
Debates about inequality often become confused because different data series answer different questions. Household income describes a flow of resources within a period. Net worth measures accumulated assets minus liabilities. Intergenerational mobility compares outcomes across parents and children. Each captures an important part of economic life; none is a substitute for the others.
The Census Bureau is a principal source for household income trends. The Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances and Distributional Financial Accounts help explain who owns assets and debt. The Congressional Budget Office adds the crucial perspective of taxes and public transfers. Mobility research draws on historical records, survey data, and, where available, linked administrative records. Sound interpretation requires attention to whether figures are inflation-adjusted, whether they use means or medians, and whether income is measured before or after taxes and transfers.
The same standards matter when comparing income, wealth, and mobility data across studies: different definitions, time periods, and populations can produce figures that appear contradictory even when they are not. A claim about the top 1 percent's share of wealth, for example, cannot be tested with a chart showing only median household income. The measure must match the question being asked.
A stronger public debate starts with this discipline. Political arguments about whether growth is inclusive should be evaluated against transparent data, the limitations of those data, and the mechanisms that could plausibly connect policy to outcomes.
More equal growth is a matter of institutions and policy
No single intervention can erase the inequalities that have accumulated over decades. Raising productivity and encouraging investment remain important. But they must be paired with institutions capable of transmitting a larger share of the benefits to households that depend primarily on wages.
Labor standards and collective bargaining can influence how earnings are distributed. Antitrust enforcement can affect concentration and bargaining leverage. Tax policy, refundable credits, Social Security, and public services can change how much income families retain and the risks they face. Investment in affordable housing, education, infrastructure, and health can make opportunity less dependent on parental wealth or postal code.
Every policy involves trade-offs. Taxes can affect incentives; poorly designed regulations can restrict supply; benefits must be financed and delivered effectively. Advocates of market-led growth rightly emphasize innovation and investment, while critics point to the consequences of allowing market rewards to accumulate without adequate counterweights. The useful question is not whether growth or redistribution matters more in the abstract. It is which combination of policies can sustain productive investment while widening participation in its rewards.
American history shows that institutions are not fixed. The New Deal, postwar labor relations, the expansion of social insurance, and later moves toward deregulation each altered the terms on which households participated in economic growth. Their achievements and limitations are still relevant because the distribution of national income is shaped by laws and bargaining arrangements as well as by technology and markets.
Prosperity should be judged by who can share in it
The United States does not face a choice between economic dynamism and a fairer distribution of opportunity. Its challenge is to make growth more broadly useful: to connect rising productivity to pay, turn economic security into a realistic goal for more families, and prevent inherited advantages from determining too much of the next generation's future.
GDP remains an essential measure of economic activity, but it is not a complete account of prosperity. A more demanding standard asks whether working households can build assets, whether communities can benefit from investment, and whether children have a reasonable chance of surpassing their parents. Economic growth becomes a stronger foundation for democracy when its rewards are not confined to those already best positioned to capture them.